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Modeling multiple-country repeated cross-sections: A societal growth curve 
model for studying the effect of the economic crisis on perceived ethnic 
threat 
 
Abstract 
While multiple-country repeated cross-sectional datasets are increasingly available, 
few cross-national studies fully exploit the richness of such dataset. This paper contributes to 
the practical knowledge on statistical analysis of cross-national time series data. For that 
purpose, we present a novel application of a societal growth curve model (Fairbrother, 2014) 
analyzing the pressing question whether the economic crisis of the past years has stirred up 
immigration-related threat perceptions among European citizens. Concretely, we analyze six 
rounds of European Social Survey data (2002-2012) to investigate whether indicators of 
economic downturn are systematically related to increased levels of economic and cultural 
threat. The societal growth curve modeling approach makes it possible to set longitudinal 
effects apart from cross-sectional differences thus overcoming the weaknesses of analyses 
relying on single-shot cross-sectional data. Our results provide evidence that growing 
unemployment as well as decreasing rates of economic growth instigate feelings of economic 
threat. Rather than affecting citizens’ opinion uniformly, the economic crisis is found to have 
the strongest impact on economic threat among low educated people. While this study 
provides evidence that economic shocks affect concerns that immigration is bad for the 
economy, feelings of cultural threat are not affected by the economic shock. 
 
Key words: group conflict theory; economic vs. cultural threat; societal growth curves; 
European Social Survey 
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Modeling multiple-country repeated cross-sections: A societal growth curve 
model for studying the effect of the economic crisis on perceived ethnic 
threat  
 
1. Introduction 
Over the course of the last decades, cross-national data collections—such as the 
European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study (EVS), or the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP)—have accumulated trend data rendering it possible to monitor 
change in citizens’ values, attitudes and behavior. These data can be characterized as cross-
national repeated cross-sections: Multiple countries are observed across a time range, but at 
each point of observation a different cross-section of the national population is surveyed. The 
potential contribution of this design to social scientific insights is very large. The longitudinal 
aspect can help to partially overcome the well-known but crucial causality problem that 
single-shot cross-national studies suffer from. Such cross-sectional studies can demonstrate 
that differences in a context variable tend to coincide with particular patterns in public 
opinion at a given time point. Such correlational patterns only provide a very shaky empirical 
foundation to make claims about causality. Cross-national trend data can provide additional 
insights in the temporal order of the relationship, which is a necessary (yet insufficient) 
condition for causality. However, according to the seminal work of Campbell and Stanley 
(1966; see also Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2001), a multi-location time series design can 
provide interesting insights, especially when experimental manipulation is not feasible. 
 While multiple-country repeated cross-sections are increasingly available, knowledge 
on statistical tools to optimally analyze such data is limited. As a result, many current cross-
national studies do not fully exploit the richness of the available data. This paper 
demonstrates the practical implementation of a statistical model to analyze multi-country 
repeated cross-sectional datasets. The second purpose of this paper is to utilize the model to 
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analyze the effect of the economic crisis on threat due to immigration among Europeans. We 
do this by providing a novel application of the societal growth curve model introduced by 
Fairbrother (2014). This model uses multilevel techniques to estimate how a particular 
aggregated individual characteristic –such as ethnic threat- develops over time on the country 
level, and to assess whether contextual variables can explain the observed over-time 
developments. We apply this model to test whether the 2008 economic crisis has affected 
perceptions of ethnic threat among European citizens. Numerous single-shot cross-national 
studies have presented empirical evidence that economic conditions are related to prejudice, 
perceived threat, and anti-immigrant sentiments (for reviews, see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; 
Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Studying the development of exclusionary attitudes over time 
in multiple countries, however, provides a more stringent test of the causal impact of 
economic conditions (for examples, see Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, 
Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006). The societal growth curve approach allows disentangling 
longitudinal and cross-sectional effects of changes in the economic context. 
 Concretely, we employ the societal growth curve model in the current study to address 
the following research questions: (1) In what way has the prevalence of perceived immigrant 
threat in European societies evolved in the period before and after the outbreak of the 
economic crisis in 2008? (2) Are the observed developments in perceived threat driven by 
changes in economic conditions due to the crisis? (3) Does the crisis affect threat perceptions 
across the whole population, or are crisis effects instead contingent on social positions in the 
form of education level? To answer these questions, we analyze data from the European 
Social Survey (ESS) across the years 2002-2012, providing information about immigration-
related threat perceptions in 28 countries before, during, and after the outbreak of the 
economic crisis. 
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 The paper starts by providing the theoretical background and formulating our research 
hypotheses. Second, we explain how societal growth curve models can be used to test our 
hypotheses using multiple-country repeated cross-sections. Subsequently, we present the data 
and measures we use. The paper concludes with a discussion on the results of the analysis and 
the usefulness of the societal growth curve model. 
 
2. Theoretical background: A dynamic formulation of group conflict theory 
Group Conflict Theory (GCT) offers a framework to understand possible effects of the 
economic crisis on prejudice, threat perceptions and anti-immigration sentiments. The central 
proposition of GCT is that negative attitudes toward outgroups—such as immigrants and 
ethnic minorities—develop as a defensive reaction of the majority group to the perception that 
prerogatives of the own group are threatened (Blumer, 1958; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 
2016; Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995). Not only economic goods (such as well-paid jobs, 
affordable housing, or the scarce resources of the welfare state), but also cultural goods (such 
as cultural traditions or society-specific norms and values) can become the subject of 
intergroup competition (Stephan et al., 1998). The distinction between the different sources of 
threat perceptions is of crucial importance, as economic and cultural threat perceptions can 
differ in their antecedents (such as social class basis) as well as in their consequences (e.g., 
prejudice or voting behavior) (Harell et al., 2012; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004). 
According to GCT, majority-members’ threat perceptions are influenced by contextual 
factors, such as economic conditions or immigrant group size (Blalock, 1967). In times of 
poor economic conditions, the material goods that are the object of intergroup competition 
become scarcer, thereby leading to an intensification of (mainly economic) threat perceptions. 
Furthermore, a more sizeable immigrant group implies that the native population is 
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confronted with a larger number of competitors, again causing intergroup competition to 
become stronger. Several empirical studies have confirmed that anti-immigration attitudes are 
more widespread in adverse economic contexts (Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov 
et al., 2006) with high levels of ethnic diversity (Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, 
Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002; Schneider, 2008), although these effects could not always be 
replicated (Sides & Citrin, 2007). A serious limitation that can be often observed in this body 
of research is its reliance on cross-sectional data sources (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). 
However, the finding that international differences in economic performance coincide with 
variations in public opinion at a given time point hardly proves that the economic crisis may 
be a cause of threat perceptions. After all, numerous other variables—such as the immigration 
history of a country, the broader political climate, the media, or the implemented migration 
and integration policies—might intervene in the relationship between economy and public 
opinion (Schlueter, Meuleman & Davidov, 2013). 
A dynamic reformulation of GCT (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman et al., 
2009) instead proposes to study how attitude changes are driven by changes in the actual 
level of competition. The theoretical rationale for this focus on changes is that sudden shifts in 
economic prosperity or immigrant presence could have more substantial effects on public 
opinion than high but stable levels of actual competition (Hopkins, 2010). Sudden changes 
affect labor, housing, and other markets more strongly than slow-paced evolutions (Olzak, 
1992) and usually receive wide media coverage (Schlueter & Davidov, 2013; McLaren, 
Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2017). A crucial methodological advantage of focusing on 
longitudinal changes is that it offers a more stringent test of the causal relationships 
articulated in the GCT. 
The—relatively few—empirical studies using a dynamic approach often support the 
propositions derived from GCT. Economic downturns were found to instigate threat 
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perceptions and anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States (Quillian, 1996), Canada 
(Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 2008), Germany (Coenders & 
Scheepers, 2008), and the Netherlands (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Coenders et al., 2008). 
Also, studies combining a cross-national and longitudinal perspective confirm the role of 
economic conditions (Semyonov et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Kuntz et al., 2017). 
Pichler (2010) furthermore demonstrates that economic conditions can also alter the 
mechanisms through which threat perceptions are formed. During periods of unfavorable 
economic conditions economic concerns come to the fore in the formation of threat 
perceptions, while cultural concerns are suppressed. 
A limitation of existing studies is that they span periods with only relatively small 
economic fluctuations. Yet, the recent economic turmoil might be conceived as a new critical 
juncture that sets in motion different mechanisms, compared to those active during more 
modest economic fluctuations (Billiet, Meuleman & De Witte, 2014; Semyonov et al., 2006). 
Little is known about the impact of a serious economic crisis. This study therefore tests 
whether the economic downturn Europe has been experiencing in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis has affected economic and cultural threat perceptions among majority-group 
citizens. Based on GCT, we expect that threat perceptions have increased in Europe since the 
beginning of the crisis in 2008 (Hypothesis 1) and that changes in threat perceptions in 
European countries are related to country-level changes in economic conditions (Hypothesis 
2). Furthermore, building on Pichler’s (2010) argument on the shifting foundations of threat 
perceptions, we expect that indicators of the economic context will have a stronger impact on 
economic than on cultural threat perceptions (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the individual-level 
component of GCT suggests that the threat-inducing effect of the crisis might be stronger 
among individuals in social-structural vulnerable positions in the form of low education 
levels, whereas there is no such effect among those who are highly educated (as a proxy for 
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being well off). This would, in other words, imply that the effect of the crisis on threat 
perceptions interacts (negatively) with education (Hypothesis 4).  
 
3. Modeling multiple-country repeated cross-sections: Societal growth curves 
The aforementioned hypotheses can be tested by means of multiple-country repeated 
cross-sectional data, that is, data consisting of several countries that are observed at different 
time points, by surveying a large number of individuals. Such data contain a three-level 
hierarchical structure, with countries at the highest level, country-years at the middle level, 
and individuals at the lowest level.  This nested structure can be taken into account by fitting a 
societal growth curve model (Fairbrother, 2014) that estimates how an individual 
characteristic evolves over time within countries - see equation (1).  
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗 + 𝜈1𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗 + 𝜈0𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑡𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗  (1) 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2) 
𝑢0𝑡𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
𝜈0𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈0
2 ) 
𝜈1𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈1
2 )  
Yitj represents a measured characteristic (e.g. perceived threat) for an individual i, 
surveyed at time point t in country j. 𝛽0 is the grand intercept in this model, referring to the 
predicted level of Y at the beginning of the time series averaged across all countries. By 
including the variable ‘time’ as a fixed effect at the second level (country-years), the overall 
evolution of the dependent variable Y is modeled, which is an essential feature of the growth 
curve approach. In equation (1), the time effect is linear (with an effect parameter 𝛽1), but the 
model can be extended in a straightforward way to include more complex functional forms of 
growth. Random effects for the intercept (𝜈0𝑗) and the slope (𝜈1𝑗) of the growth curve are 
included to accommodate the country specificity of threat developments over time, that is, 
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how the growth curve in a specific country deviates from the average developmental pattern. 
The model also contains random components at the middle (uotj) and lowest (eitj) levels. uotj 
reflects how country-years deviate from the country-specific growth curve. eitj captures the 
individual-level residuals. This approach shows similarity to conventional multilevel growth 
curve models for panel data (e.g. Andreß, Golsch & Schmidt, 2013). The main difference is 
that the occurrence of repeated measurements is not at the level of individuals, but rather at 
the level of the countries. As a consequence, the intercepts of the growth curve are situated at 
the level of the country-years (level 2), and the intercept variation is captured by its variance 
component 𝜈0𝑗. The slope of the growth curve is estimated by the linear effect of the time 
variable, the slope variation is absorbed in its variance component 𝜈1𝑗. As such, the societal 
growth curve model is essentially a classical two-level growth curve model for countries, with 
an additional layer of individuals underneath. 
One could add to this baseline model individual-level as well as contextual predictors. 
Of crucial importance is that the societal growth curve approach makes it possible to partition 
the impact of contextual variables into a cross-sectional and a longitudinal component by 
simultaneously including a time-invariant (i.e., the average over the complete time series) and 
a time-varying component (the year-specific deviation of that average) of the contextual 
variables into the models (Fairbrother, 2014). This decomposition into cross-sectional and 
longitudinal associations takes place by simultaneously including time-invariant and time-
varying components of the contextual variables in the models (Fairbrother, 2014; this 
decomposition is similar to disentangling between- and within-cluster covariate effects in 
clustered data—see Neuhaus & Kalbfleisch, 1998).  
Take a contextual variable Ztj that varies across countries as well as time points (e.g., 
the unemployment rate). Time-invariant component Z•j equals the value of this contextual 
variable for a particular country averaged over the whole observed time series (e.g., the 
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average unemployment rate of a specific country between 2001 and 2012). The parameter for 
this time-invariant component captures the cross-sectional relationship between context and 
threat levels, irrespective of changes over time. The time-varying component is calculated as 
the deviation of the observed value at a specific time point from the country average over the 
whole time series (Ztj - Z•j). The parameter for the time-varying component describes 
longitudinal relationships, that is, how variations in perceived threat over time within 
countries (from their longitudinal average) are associated with changes in a contextual 
variable. Because Z•j and (Ztj - Z•j) are included simultaneously in the model, the parameter for 
the time-varying component reflects the pure longitudinal effect, controlling for its average 
over the whole time series.  
Finally, cross-level interactions between the longitudinal variations of contextual 
variables and individual characteristics can be included to investigate whether the growth 
curve components (intercept and slope) vary across different categories of individuals.  
 
4. Materials and methods  
Dataset: European Social Survey, 2002-2012 
We analyze data from a time series of six rounds of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), spanning the period before and after the crisis (2002-2012). This multi-location time-
series design is one of the strongest alternatives when experimental manipulation is not 
feasible, under the condition that the event that should bring about change in the time series 
(the quasi treatment) is well specified a priori (which is the case here) (Campbell & Stanley, 
1966: 38; see also Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2001). The logic behind it is that it is unlikely 
that particular quasi-experimental treatments are followed by an outcome change in multiple 
locations, if the effect is not causal.  
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Since the focus is on change, we include only countries that participated in at least two 
ESS rounds. Our dataset comprises 28 countries with a total of 137 country-year 
combinations. In all countries, strict probability samples of the resident population aged 15 
years and older were drawn. Because we are interested in the attitude patterns among 
members of the majority population, respondents who were born outside the country, who 
have a foreign nationality, or who consider themselves as a member of an ethnic minority 
group are removed from the sample (see also Sarrasin, Green, Fasel & Davidov, 2015). The 
total sample size equals 228,331 individuals (for sample sizes per country and year and 
country abbreviations, see Appendix 1). 
 
Measurements 
Dependent variables – The ESS core module contains two items that were designed to 
measure economic and cultural threat perceptions.
i
 Respondents are invited to position 
themselves on an 11-point scale of which the endpoints refer to perceiving immigration as a 
disadvantage or as an advantage for the economy (‘Would you say it is generally bad or good 
for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?’) or the cultural 
life (‘Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by 
people coming to live here from other countries?’). The scales are reversed, so that 0 indicates 
low and 10 high threat. While these items have been used as indicators of a single concept of 
general group threat in previous research (Sides & Citrin, 2007), we analyze them separately 
to render the difference between economic and cultural sources of threat visible (for a similar 
approach, see Pichler, 2010).
ii
 This approach is justified by the fact that both items contain—
especially at the individual and country-year level—considerable unique information. The 
correlation between economic and cultural threat equals 0.60 at the individual level, 0.71 at 
the country-year level, and 0.83 at the country level, implying that the two items share 36.0, 
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50.1, and 69.3 percent of their variance at these respective levels. These unique components 
allow sufficient room for differential effects of individual as well as contextual predictors (see 
below). 
Contextual predictor variables – All contextual variables were retrieved from the 
Eurostat website (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). The economic context is captured by means of 
the real GDP growth rate (Eurostat indicator nama_gdp_k) and the harmonized 
unemployment rate (Eurostat indicator une_rt_a). Changes in immigrant group size are 
measured by the inflow of foreign immigrants (Eurostat indicator migr_imm1ctz) per capita. 
We include the time-invariant as well as the time-varying components of these contextual 
variables. Concretely, we average contextual information over two years to indicate the time-
varying component referring to a specific time point (e.g., the average unemployment rate of 
2001 and 2002 is taken to predict threat perceptions in the 2002 survey). This choice reflects 
that the impact of economic contexts may be lagged. The time-invariant component is the 
average across the whole time series (2002-2012). 
Individual-level predictor variables – In order to control for compositional differences 
– that is, the fact that European populations have a different composition in terms of several 
individual characteristics - we include a series of variables capturing social-structural 
positions and cultural dispositions that were shown to be relevant in previous research (e.g. 
Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet 2009; Meuleman, Abts, 
Slootmaeckers & Meeusen, 2017; Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky 2006). The social-
structural variables are gender, age, number of years of education completed, degree of 
urbanization (from 1 = countryside to 5 = big city), employment status (distinguishing self-
employed, higher service class, white collar, blue collar, unemployed, retired, in education, 
doing housework, disabled, and other) and subjective income. The latter variable is used as a 
proxy for the household income and is operationalized by the individual assessment of 
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whether one finds it difficult or comfortable to live on the present income (1 = very difficult; 
2 = difficult; 3 = coping; 4 = living comfortably). Based on previous literature, we expect 
people in socially vulnerable positions, that is with lower education and lower subjective 
income, the unemployed and the low-skilled workers to feel more threatened by immigrants. 
Furthermore, older individuals are expected to be more negative toward immigrants (e.g., 
Hercowitz-Amir, Raijman & Davidov 2017; Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, 
Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006). 
Religious involvement is the mean of items measuring subjective religiosity (ESS item 
rlgdgr), attendance of religious services (rlgatnd) and frequency of praying (pray). Political 
orientation is measured by self-placement on a left (0) to right (10) scale. This scale was 
categorized into three groups, namely, left (scores 0-4), center (5), and right (6-10). To handle 
the considerable nonresponse of this item, we added a fourth category for the missing values. 
Secular persons as well as left-leaning individuals are assumed to express lower levels of 
perceived ethnic threat (see, e.g., Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017). 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are displayed in Appendix 2. 
 
Statistical modeling 
The random effect models are estimated by means of the MIXED procedure of SAS 
9.3, using a restricted maximum likelihood estimation method. To obtain standard errors that 
are robust against deviations of the distributional assumptions of the random effects (such as 
non-normality), we furthermore used the “sandwich estimator” (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 
2000: 87ff). All analyses are weighted to correct for cross-national differences in sampling 
design (dweight). All continuous individual-level predictor variables were centered around 
their grand mean prior to the analysis. Apart from political orientation –where a separate 
category for the missing values is created, we applied listwise deletion to deal with the item 
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non-response. The amount of missing values in the data was quite limited and lower than 5% 
on average ranging between 4.6% for the variable economic threat and 0.1% for gender. 
Therefore, we do not expect that using listwise deletion distorts our conclusions (see Schafer 
& Graham, 2002). 
 
5. Results 
Trends in perceived threat, 2002-2012 
Before presenting the societal growth curves, we explore the development in threat 
perceptions over the period 2002-2012. Considerable cross-country differences can be 
observed in the level of perceived economic threat (see Figure 1), ranging from as low as 3.36 
(Luxemburg, 2002) to as high as 7.22 (Cyprus, 2012) (on a scale from 0 to 10). These 
differences follow regional patterns, with the lowest levels of economic threat in Northern 
Europe and the highest scores in Eastern and Southern Europe. Longitudinal developments 
within countries appear to be smaller than between-country differences. The most notable 
change is observed in Ireland, where economic threat shifts from 4.04 (2006) to 5.28 (2008) 
to 5.85 (2010). Progression of economic threat is patterned along regional lines as well. In the 
Nordic countries, which already displayed comparatively low threat in 2002, economic threat 
perceptions tend to stabilize or even diminish. In Southern Europe, by way of contrast, a clear 
upward trend is notable. It is revealing to observe that between 2008 (the outbreak of the 
financial crisis) and 2010 (when its impact on the economy was becoming clear), economic 
threat perceptions became more prevalent in 20 countries, while they became weaker in 3 
countries only (see also Kuntz et al., 2017).  
Regarding cultural threat (Figure 2), the specific position of Scandinavian countries 
becomes even more distinct. Northern Europeans perceive substantially less cultural threat 
compared to citizens in Western, Eastern, and Southern Europe. Importantly, longitudinal 
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changes in cultural threat are less outspoken than in the case of economic threat. At least 
during our time window of observation, cultural threat perceptions seem to be a more stable 
phenomenon, while economic threat perceptions tend to fluctuate substantially.  
(Figures 1 & 2 about here) 
 
 Societal growth curves: The longitudinal impact of economic conditions 
To examine the effects of economic conditions on threat perceptions, we estimate a 
series of societal growth curve models for economic and cultural threat (see Tables 1 and 2). 
An empty three-level model (not shown) indicates that economic and cultural threat 
perceptions vary significantly across individuals, country time points combinations as well as 
countries. The lion’s share of the total variation can be attributed to the individual level. 
Variations of threat between countries (7.5% of the total variance for economic threat vs. 
12.9% for cultural threat) are considerably larger than longitudinal variations of threat within 
countries. Notably, the longitudinal variation of economic threat (2.0%) is more than double 
than that of cultural threat (0.9%). 
Models 1E (Table 1) and 1C (Table 2) estimate growth curves by including time as a 
predictor. A linear time trend combined with a dummy for 2010 (picking up an additional 
change in 2010 over and above the linear process) provides the most appropriate description 
of the data. For both forms of threat, the linear time effect is insignificant, but does have 
significant random slope variation. This means that, on average across all countries, threat 
perceptions remain stable between 2002 and 2012; the linear trend does vary cross-nationally, 
however, with increases in some countries and decreases in others. One particular ripple 
disturbs the linear development of threat perceptions. The dummy for 2010 has a significant 
and positive effect. In 2010 (i.e., following the outbreak of the financial crisis), economic and 
cultural threat perceptions were respectively 0.116 and 0.120 units higher than what is 
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expected based on the general time trend. This pattern confirms that immigrant-related threat 
perceptions have increased across Europe after the 2008 crisis (supporting Hypothesis 1), 
although the magnitude of the increase should not be overrated. Furthermore, the 2010 
increase in threat perceptions was instantaneous and had receded by 2012.  
Indicators of the economic context as well as individual characteristics are added in 
Models 2E and 2C. Economic and cultural threat perceptions are—to a large extent but not 
completely—driven by the same set of individual predictors. As expected by theories of 
ethnic competition, threat perceptions are most outspoken among individuals with a lower 
socioeconomic status. Fewer years of education and a lower (subjective) income seem 
conducive towards increased threat perceptions. Concerning employment status, the highest 
levels of threat perceptions are observed among blue collar workers, followed by persons who 
are unemployed, retired, disabled, or homemakers. Members of the higher service class and 
those in education feel least threatened. Furthermore, also persons living in a rural 
environment express higher levels of economic and cultural threat. Consistent with previsous 
research (e.g. Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006), political orientation is among the 
strongest predictors of perceived threat: left-leaning individuals feel culturally as well as 
economically less threatened. Apart from these similarities, three individual variables have a 
differential impact. Males feel economically less threatened than females, while no gender 
gap is present for cultural threat. Furthermore, the highest levels of cultural threat are found 
among respondents between the ages of 55 and 74 years, while this age group does not 
deviate from the reference category (aged 45-54 years) on economic threat. Finally, religiosity 
has a small tempering effect on economic threat but shows no significant relationship with 
cultural threat.  
To find out whether changes in the economic context affect threat perceptions, Models 
2E and 2C include the country time-invariant (cross-sectional) and the time-varying 
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(longitudinal) components of two economic variables, namely, the unemployment rate and the 
real GDP growth. The longitudinal components of unemployment and economic growth have 
a significant impact on feelings of economic threat. In times of rising unemployment rates and 
plummeting growth rates, citizens’ anxieties that immigration poses a threat to the national 
economy gain momentum (supporting Hypothesis 2). These longitudinal effects of economic 
context are substantial. Spain, for example, experienced an increase in unemployment rate of 
12.4 percentage points and a drop in economic growth of 3.8 percentage points between 2005-
6 (the 3
rd
 ESS round) and 2010-11 (the 5
th
 ESS round). Model 2E predicts that the 
combination of these economic shocks increased economic threat perceptions across the 
whole Spanish population with more than 0.6 points, which implies a considerable increase. It 
is of crucial importance to reiterate that these parameters refer to longitudinal effects, 
capturing the impact that national economic conditions at particular time points have on the 
evolution of threat perceptions within countries. At the same time, no significant cross-
sectional relationships between the average country levels of economic context and economic 
threat are detected. Model 2E explains 7.8% of the individual variation, 42.7% of the 
variation between country-years and 25.1% of the between-country differences in economic 
threat. The model is thus quite successful in explaining why a country’s level of economic 
threat is higher at particular time points than in other years. Note that the effect of the dummy 
for 2010 has become insignificant, indicating that the high levels of economic threat in that 
particular year are indeed driven by economic changes. 
Whereas economic conditions shape the development of perceived economic threat, 
no such contextual effects are found for cultural threat. The idea that immigration threatens 
the nation’s cultural life is not only relatively stable over time, but also completely detached 
from economic changes. Crisis-induced threat perceptions seem to be limited to concerns 
about economy, and do not generalize to the cultural realm. This finding is in line with 
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Hypothesis 3. For cultural threat, Model 2C explains 22.7%, 37.3%, and 8.0% of the variance 
of the dependent variable at the country, country-time, and individual levels respectively. 
One of the specific features of the societal growth curve approach is that contextual 
variables are decomposed into a cross-sectional and a longitudinal component. In order to 
scrutinize the similarities and differences with the classical approach –that is, including the 
raw context variables, without decomposition- we additionally estimated models in which 
only the unemployment rates and GDP growth scores in the year of the survey are included.
iii
 
We find that the effects of unemployment rate (on economic threat: 0.0351; on cultural threat: 
0.0043) and GDP growth (on economic threat: -0.0530; on cultural threat: -0.0031) are very 
similar to the longitudinal effects found in Models 2E and 2C. This similarity is however 
particular for the current analysis. It is most likely a result of the fact that the cross-sectional 
effects per se in our growth models are quite small and insignificant. This may not always be 
the case, however. In some cases the cross-sectional component of a country score may have 
an effect on the dependent variable that is stronger or even opposite compared to the effect of 
the longitudinally varying component. Without decomposition, the estimated context effect is 
a mixture between the cross-sectional and the longitudinal effect. If both effects are 
considerable and different, omitting the decomposition can lead to incorrect conclusions. 
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the effect of economic conditions 
on economic and cultural threat respectively, controlling for the inflow of foreign immigrants 
(per capita).
iv
 Neither the longitudinal nor the cross-sectional components of foreign 
immigration are related to either economic or cultural threat perceptions. The most important 
conclusion from this additional model is that the longitudinal effects of the economic 
variables unemployment and economic growth on economic threat remain significant, and are 
thus not driven by a possible connection between migration movements and the severity of 
the economic crisis. 
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(Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
 
The fourth hypothesis—namely, that the longitudinal effects of the economic context 
are stronger among low-educated individuals—is tested in Models 3E and 3C. These models 
now contain a random slope for education (implying that the educational gradient of threat 
perceptions can vary across countries and time points) as well as a cross-level interaction 
effects between education and the time-varying component of the unemployment rate (testing 
whether the longitudinal effect of unemployment rates differs across educational groups).
v
 In 
the case of economic threat, the longitudinal effects of unemployment are indeed different for 
various educational groups (see Figure 3). For an individual with an average level of 
education (12.5 years), represented by the middle line in Figure 3, economic threat 
perceptions increase by 0.033 point for every percentage point increase in unemployment rate. 
The negative cross-level interaction parameter (-0.004) indicates that this effect of 
unemployment becomes weaker as education increases. For individuals who have had 19 
years of education (i.e., 6.85 years more than the average, corresponding to the 90
th
 percentile 
in the dataset), the longitudinal effect of unemployment approaches zero, meaning that 
unemployment rates are no longer related to threat levels. For respondents with only 7 years 
of formal education (i.e., 5.85 years less than the average, corresponding to the 10
th
 
percentile), the impact of unemployment context is twice as strong as for the average person. 
This significant cross-level interaction effect shows that contextual labor market processes do 
not instigate economic threat perceptions uniformly across the whole population. Instead, this 
sociotropic source of threat seems to affect, in the first place, persons with lower education 
(i.e., those with a more vulnerable position in the society and the labor market), while the 
threat perceptions of the highly educated are more immune to the impact of labor market 
changes. 
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A similar test (not shown here) revealed that the cross-level interaction between real 
GDP growth rate and education is insignificant. Hereby, Hypothesis 4 is only partially 
supported by the data. In the case of cultural threat, none of the cross-level interactions was 
significant (which is not surprising given that the main effect of the economic context was 
insignificant for cultural threat).  
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
In sum, this analysis reveals that economic threat perceptions have increased after the 
2008 crisis (supporting Hypothesis 1), although the increase was only temporary. 
Furthermore, the changes in threat perceptions are driven by changes in the economic context 
(supporting Hypothesis 2) and are only observed for the economic component of threat 
(Hypothesis 3). Finally, the effects of economic conditions are more outspoken of the lower-
educated individuals (Hypothesis 4). 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
The first purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the practical implementation of a 
statistical model to analyze multi-country repeated cross-sectional datasets. While such 
datasets are increasingly available, few cross-national studies optimally exploit the richness of 
datasets containing information on citizens surveyed in various countries and at different time 
points. The second purpose of this paper is to utilize the model to analyze the effect of the 
economic crisis on threat due to immigration among Europeans. We do this by providing a 
novel application of the societal growth curve model introduced by Fairbrother (2014) to test 
whether the 2008 economic crisis has affected perceptions of ethnic threat among European 
citizens. More concretely, drawing on the dynamic version of group conflict theory, the 
current study addressed the following three research questions: (1) In what way has the 
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prevalence of perceived immigrant threat in European societies evolved in the period before 
and after the peak of the economic crisis in 2008? (2) Are the observed developments in 
perceived economic and cultural threat driven by crisis-related changes in economic 
conditions? (3) Does the crisis affect threat perceptions across the whole population, or are 
crisis effects instead contingent on socioeconomic status? We answered these questions by 
analyzing ESS data from 28 different European countries spanning the years 2002 to 2012.  
Societal growth curve analysis substantiates in various ways that economic contexts 
shape the majority group perceptions that immigration poses a threat to the national economy. 
Between 2008 (just before or during the outbreak of the financial crisis) and 2010 (i.e., when 
the impact of the crisis on the “real economy” was becoming clear), we detected an increase – 
albeit short-lived – in economic threat perceptions in 20 European countries. Even more 
conclusive is the finding that rates of unemployment and economic growth have a 
longitudinal effect on economic threat perceptions: In times when unemployment rates 
increase and growth rates plummet, citizens’ perceptions that immigrants threaten the 
economy become more widespread. These effects are purely longitudinal in the sense that 
they refer to the dynamics within countries (instead of cross-sectional differences between 
countries), and therefore lend strong support to the dynamic version of group threat theory. 
The deterioration of economic conditions in Europe indeed instigated fears that immigrants 
threaten economic prerogatives of the majority group, which might in turn open the door to 
exclusionary attitudes and discriminatory behavior. The difficult economic situation that 
Europe has been facing over the past years offers a breeding ground in which economic threat 
perceptions can easily take root. Finally, the model demonstrated that the effect of the 
economic crisis (i.e., increasing unemployment rates) is stronger among individuals with 
lower educational credentials. 
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The impact of economic conditions on threat perceptions is substantial, but should not 
be overstated and qualified in several respects. First of all, despite the fact that our analysis 
covered a period of unprecedented economic instability, changes in threat perceptions remain 
relatively limited. Differences between countries or citizens are markedly more outspoken 
than longitudinal variation. A severe economic shock (comparable to what a country like 
Spain experienced) produces an effect similar in size to the effect of social class (blue-collar 
workers vs. higher service class) or political orientation (left vs. right), but does not exceed 
the joint impact of individual-level predictors. Second, our results suggest that the economic 
crisis had an instantaneous effect rather than a long-lasting one. Threat perceptions did 
increase in the aftermath of the 2008 outbreak of the crisis, but had fallen back to pre-crisis 
levels by 2012. As soon as the labor market recovers and economic production takes off 
again, economic threat perceptions dissipate. Third, the impact of the economic crisis appears 
to be restricted to economic threat. Feelings of cultural threat are found to be relatively stable 
over time and to be completely detached from economic dynamics. At least within our 
window of observation, crisis-induced threat perceptions do not generalize to the idea that 
immigrants pose a threat to cultural life.  
In sum, societal growth curve models offer promising opportunities to investigate the 
drivers and timing of attitude change. Further research could take this argument and method 
even further, for example by investigating shorter time spans, and linking public opinion to 
monthly instead of yearly context data. Our study shows that the societal growth curve 
models offer opportunities to analyze cross-national repeated cross-sections. Most 
importantly, by distinguishing between cross-sectional and longitudinal context effects, this 
approach successfully avoids the problem of weak internal validity that one faces when 
analyzing single-shot cross-sectional data.   
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Figure 1: Development of perceived economic threat in 28 countries (by region) – 2002-2012 
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Figure 2: Development of perceived cultural threat in 28 countries (by region) – 2002-2012 
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Figure 3: The interaction effect between education and the time-varying component of 
national unemployment rates 
 
This figure represents predicted levels of economic threat for various values of education 
(10
th
 percentile in the highest curve, 50
th
 percentile in the middle curve, 90
th
 percentile in the 
lowest curve) and the time-varying component of the unemployment rate (full range), as well 
as 95% confidence bands for these predictions (the grey zone around the curves).  
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Table 1. Societal growth curve models for economic threat 
  
Model 1E Model 2E Model 3E 
Fixed effects - indiv. level 
Par. 
Est. SE 
 
Par. 
Est. SE 
 
Par. 
Est. SE 
 Intercept 5.155 (0.124) *** 5.195 (0.287) *** 5.650 (0.348) *** 
Time -0.006 (0.025) 
 
-0.031 (0.016) 
 
-0.040 (0.025) 
 Dummy: time-point 2008 0.116 (0.055) * -0.122 (0.068) 
 
-0.159 (0.087) 
 Gender 
         
 
male 
   
-0.264 (0.028) *** -0.261 (0.027) *** 
 
female (ref.cat.) 
         Age category 
         
 
16-24 years 
   
0.155 (0.056) ** 0.141 (0.055) * 
 
25-34 years 
   
0.103 (0.031) *** 0.100 (0.030) *** 
 
35-44 years 
   
0.049 (0.021) * 0.050 (0.020) * 
 
45-54 years (ref.cat.) 
         
 
55-64 years 
   
0.023 (0.033) 
 
0.025 (0.032) 
 
 
65-74 years 
   
0.023 (0.058) 
 
0.029 (0.057) 
 
 
75 years and over 
   
0.047 (0.064) 
 
0.044 (0.064) 
 Education 
   
-0.099 (0.006) *** -0.101 (0.006) *** 
Activity status 
         
 
Self-employed 
   
-0.300 (0.044) *** -0.295 (0.044) *** 
 
Higher service class 
   
-0.632 (0.056) *** -0.614 (0.054) *** 
 
White collar 
   
-0.393 (0.039) *** -0.389 (0.038) *** 
 
Blue collar (ref.cat.) 
         
 
Unemployed 
   
-0.102 (0.040) * -0.103 (0.040) * 
 
Retired 
   
-0.183 (0.033) *** -0.187 (0.033) *** 
 
In education 
   
-0.764 (0.045) *** -0.758 (0.044) *** 
 
Doing housework 
   
-0.235 (0.037) *** -0.219 (0.034) *** 
 
Disabled 
   
-0.022 (0.049) 
 
-0.032 (0.050) 
 
 
Other 
   
-0.405 (0.066) *** -0.391 (0.065) *** 
Subjective income 
   
-0.300 (0.013) *** -0.307 (0.012) *** 
Urbanization 
   
-0.068 (0.008) *** -0.069 (0.007) *** 
Religious involvement 
   
-0.030 (0.009) *** -0.028 (0.009) ** 
Left-right placement 
         
 
Left (ref.cat.) 
         
 
Centre 
   
0.370 (0.053) *** 0.357 (0.053) *** 
 
Right 
   
0.308 (0.082) *** 0.300 (0.082) *** 
 
Missing 
   
0.600 (0.060) *** 0.593 (0.060) *** 
Fixed effects - context variables 
         Unemp. rate - Longitudinal 
   
0.035 (0.012) ** 0.033 (0.016) * 
Unemp. - Cross-sectional 
   
0.049 (0.042) 
 
0.010 (0.051) 
 GDP growth - Longitudinal 
   
-0.052 (0.015) *** -0.050 (0.023) * 
GDP growth - Cross-sectional 
   
-0.115 (0.106) 
 
-0.180 (0.134) 
 Education x Unemp. rate - Longit. 
      
-0.004 (0.001) *** 
Random effects 
         Level 3: Var. country intercept 0.366 (0.114) *** 0.326 (0.102) *** 0.311 (0.155) ** 
Level 3: Var. slope time 0.010 (0.005) * 0.003 (0.003) 
 
0.005 (0.004) 
 Level 2: Var. country-year 
intercept 0.083 (0.013) *** 0.065 (0.011) *** 0.065 (0.023) *** 
Level 2: Var. slope education 
      
0.000 (0.000) *** 
Level 1: Residual variance 5.224 (0.016) *** 4.817 (0.015) *** 4.787 (0.015) *** 
Deviance 941487.7 924925.3 924479.9 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Nindividuals=205,759, Ncountry-years=137, Ncountries=28 
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Table 2. Societal growth curve models for cultural threat 
 
  
Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C 
Fixed effects - indiv. level 
Par. 
Est. SE 
 
Par. 
Est. SE 
 
Par. 
Est. SE 
 Intercept 4.488 (0.160) *** 4.173 (0.336) *** 5.087 (0.388) *** 
Time 0.006 (0.021) 
 
0.014 (0.020) 
 
0.002 (0.028) 
 Dummy: time-point 2008 0.120 (0.035) ** 0.085 (0.065) 
 
0.050 (0.098) 
 Gender 
         
 
male 
   
0.057 (0.036) 
 
0.062 (0.036) 
 
 
female (ref.cat.) 
         Age category 
         
 
16-24 years 
   
0.133 (0.061) * 0.113 (0.061) 
 
 
25-34 years 
   
0.002 (0.035) 
 
-0.002 (0.033) 
 
 
35-44 years 
   
-0.026 (0.016) 
 
-0.025 (0.015) 
 
 
45-54 years (ref.cat.) 
         
 
55-64 years 
   
0.066 (0.028) * 0.069 (0.028) * 
 
65-74 years 
   
0.146 (0.054) ** 0.159 (0.052) ** 
 
75 years and over 
   
0.234 (0.059) *** 0.238 (0.058) *** 
Education 
   
-0.103 (0.008) *** -0.105 (0.008) *** 
Activity status 
         
 
Self-employed 
   
-0.228 (0.042) *** -0.219 (0.043) *** 
 
Higher service class 
   
-0.505 (0.060) *** -0.473 (0.056) *** 
 
White collar 
   
-0.407 (0.041) *** -0.400 (0.040) *** 
 
Blue collar (ref.cat.) 
         
 
Unemployed 
   
-0.144 (0.051) ** -0.146 (0.050) ** 
 
Retired 
   
-0.099 (0.036) ** -0.103 (0.036) ** 
 
In education 
   
-0.722 (0.052) *** -0.712 (0.051) *** 
 
Doing housework 
   
-0.199 (0.039) *** -0.176 (0.038) *** 
 
Disabled 
   
0.000 (0.055) 
 
-0.018 (0.053) 
 
 
Other 
   
-0.377 (0.077) *** -0.363 (0.076) *** 
Subjective income 
   
-0.230 (0.015) *** -0.243 (0.015) *** 
Urbanization 
   
-0.059 (0.013) *** -0.064 (0.012) *** 
Religious involvement 
   
-0.014 (0.009) 
 
-0.011 (0.009) 
 Left-right placement 
         
 
Left (ref.cat.) 
         
 
Centre 
   
0.492 (0.064) *** 0.468 (0.063) *** 
 
Right 
   
0.564 (0.105) *** 0.548 (0.105) *** 
 
Missing 
   
0.682 (0.079) *** 0.669 (0.078) *** 
Fixed effects - context variables 
         Unemp. rate - Longitudinal 
   
0.004 (0.012) 
 
-0.012 (0.021) 
 Unemp. - Cross-sectional 
   
0.033 (0.049) 
 
-0.051 (0.052) 
 GDP growth - Longitudinal 
   
-0.003 (0.012) 
 
-0.011 (0.026) 
 GDP growth - Cross-sectional 
   
-0.084 (0.138) 
 
-0.198 (0.138) 
 Education x Unemp. rate - Longit. 
      
-0.003 (0.002) 
 Random effects 
         Level 3: Var. country intercept 0.713 (0.202) ** 0.619 (0.184) ** 0.673 (0.210) ** 
Level 3: Var. slope time 0.008 (0.004) * 0.008 (0.004) * 0.009 (0.006) 
 Level 2: Var. country-year 
intercept 0.034 (0.006) *** 0.034 (0.006) *** 0.083 (0.019) *** 
Level 2: Var. slope education 
      
0.002 (0.000) *** 
Level 1: Residual variance 5.344 (0.017) *** 4.917 (0.015) *** 4.885 (0.015) *** 
Deviance 946739.0 929758.3 928820.8 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Nindividuals= 205,905, Ncountry-years=137, Ncountries=28 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Sample sizes per country and year 
 
Round 1 
- 2002 
Round 2 
- 2004 
Round 3 
- 2006 
Round 4 
- 2008 
Round 5 
- 2010 
Round 6 
- 2012 
Total 
Austria (AT) 1,973 2,023 2,198 - - - - - - 6,194 
Belgium (BE) 1,700 1,574 1,611 1,535 1,473 1,565 9,458 
Bulgaria (BG) - - - - 1,179 1,816 1,978 1,844 6,817 
Switzerland (CH) 1,610 1,671 1,402 1,338 1,094 1,079 8,194 
Cyprus (CY) - - - - 932 1,105 1,000 985 4,022 
Czech Republic (CZ) 1,278 2,851 - - 1,937 2,281 1,929 10,276 
Germany (DE) 2,648 2,575 2,619 2,459 2,686 2,597 15,584 
Denmark (DK) 1,417 1,404 1,404 1,491 1,453 1,518 8,687 
Estonia (EE) - - 1,395 958 1,147 1,383 1,714 6,597 
Spain (ES) 1,616 1,489 1,682 2,305 1,660 1,633 10,385 
Finland (FI) 1,924 1,977 1,824 2,118 1,797 2,079 11,719 
France (FR) 1,314 1,621 1,762 1,861 1,532 1,715 9,805 
Great Britain (GB) 1,796 1,662 2,086 2,037 2,070 1,946 11,597 
Greece (GR) 2,279 2,135 - - 1,886 2,370 - - 8,670 
Croatia (HR) - - - - - - 1,272 1,407 - - 2,679 
Hungary (HU) 1,562 1,414 1,406 1,433 1,447 1,874 9,136 
Ireland (IE) 1,866 2,111 1,538 1,462 2,146 2,218 11,341 
Iceland (IS) - - 553 - - - - - - 691 1,244 
Italy (IT) 1,171 1,487 - - - - - - 883 3,541 
Lithuania (LT) - - - - - - - - 1,519 1,938 3,457 
Luxembourg (LU) 951 1,043 - - - - - - - - 1,994 
Netherlands (NL) 2,167 1,690 1,688 1,572 1,657 1,639 10,413 
Norway (NO) 1,881 1,607 1,596 1,394 1,351 1,384 9,213 
Poland (PL) 2,027 1,672 1,682 1,576 1,707 1,843 10,507 
Portugal (PT) 1,412 1,922 1,995 2,199 1,990 2,002 11,520 
Sweden (SE) 1,766 1,745 1,690 1,591 1,300 1,585 9,677 
Slovenia (SI) 1,349 1,316 1,338 1,161 1,255 1,127 7,546 
Slovakia (SK) - - 1,388 1,558 1,666 1,727 1,719 8,058 
Total 35,707 40,325 34,148 38,361 40,283 39,507 228,331 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
  
Percent N 
Gender 
female 53.5 122,057 
male 46.5 106,018 
Total 100.0 228,075 
Age category 
16-24 14.0 31,738 
25-34 14.8 33,624 
35-44 17.2 38,979 
45-54 17.1 38,847 
55-64 16.4 37,206 
65-74 12.6 28,714 
75+ 8.0 18,141 
Total 100.0 227,249 
Employment status 
self-employed 6.5 14,626 
higher service class 6.3 14,185 
white-collar workers 20.9 47,052 
blue-collar workers 14.9 33,576 
unemployed 5.2 11,835 
retired 24.5 55,458 
in education 8.6 19,496 
homemakers 9.1 20,596 
disabled 2.3 5,282 
other 1.3 2,922 
Total 99.6 225,028 
Left-right placement 
Left 27.7 63,239 
Center 28.82 65,804 
Right 30.92 70,598 
Missing 12.57 28,690 
 
 
Mean SD Min Max N 
Economic threat perceptions 5.21 2.39 0 10 217917 
Cultural threat perceptions 4.50 2.49 0 10 218073 
Education (in years) 12.10 4.03 0 30 225821 
Subjective income 2.98 0.86 1 4 222897 
Urbanization 3.04 1.21 1 5 227676 
Religious involvement 4.40 2.55 0.71 10 227353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
                                                        
i
 The core module of the ESS contains a third item measuring immigration-related group threats (ESS item 
imwbcnt). Because the wording of this item is very general and does not refer to specific sources of threat, we do 
not include it in the analysis. 
ii
 The use of single items instead of multi-item batteries makes it difficult to assess the reliability, validity, and 
cross-cultural comparability of the measurements. To get an indication of the measurement quality, we 
performed multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (Davidov et al., 2014) on the three threat items included 
in the ESS across our 137 country-year combinations. Partial measurement equivalence could be established for 
all countries but Ireland (the output may be provided by the first author upon request). As a result, the data allow 
us to conduct meaningful comparisons across all countries and time points. To rule out that the outlier Ireland 
biases our conclusions, we re-estimated all our models excluding the Irish data as a robustness check, but the 
effects of the economic context remained unchanged. 
iii
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. The full results are not shown here, but 
can be obtained from the first author. 
iv
 The full results not shown here, but can be obtained from the first author. This control variable was only 
included in this stage of the modeling process because the migration flow statistics contain several missing 
values and lead to the exclusion of the following country-years: FR 2002; FR 2004; GR 2002; GR 2004; IS 
2004; PT 2002; PT 2004; PT 2006). 
v
 We test the cross-level interaction for education rather than for employment status, because the latter variable is 
categorical which makes the estimation and interpretation of the interaction more difficult and less insightful. A 
similar hypothesis could in principle be tested for subjective income. However, including multiple interactions of 
connected variables at the same time makes the results less insightful. 
